Grants, Limitations, Know-How, and Other Perils in International Licensing--Some Contemporary Advice by Freedman, Stanley A.
GRANTS, LIMITATIONS, KNOW-HOW, AND OTHER PERILS IN
INTERNATIONAL LICENSING-SOME CONTEMPORARY
ADVICE
STANLEY A. FREEDMAN*
These days, after reading the cases1 and the speeches of the new anti-
patent antitrust activists in the Department of Justice, 2 it is hard to under-
stand why anyone in his right mind licenses patents, trademarks or know-
how to anyone else, domestic or foreign. The antitrust hostility and suspicion
engendered by the very mention of the word "license" are themselves
enough to blight the most innocent commercial hopes.
The principal, if not the only, legitimate purpose of licensing--so it
seems from a reading of the recent literature-is to create, nurture, and
bring to maturity a successful competitor. Any licensing arrangement that
does not have that purpose and effect is quite likely to be considered il-
legal in context, if not illegal per se.
If that is the way the law is tending, then it can only be urged upon
clients one and all the wisdom of seeking licenses from others but granting
none themselves. Nor need clients be too choosy or prickly about the
terms they are offered: the Justice Department and the courts stand ready
to relieve them from unduly onerous stipulations that might restrain their
ability to bite the hand that feeds them, and even to spare them the obli-
gation to pay for what they get.3
Why should anyone today license others under his patents, know-how
and trademarks? In the typical case, a client has, through long and hard
experience, aided by judicious injections of applied research, learned how
to make certain products in a superior way, or to use certain processes to
achieve a commercially desirable result. Probably he has acquired one or
more patents, and has some applications pending in the United States,
plus a scattering of counterpart or parallel patents and applications in vari-
ous likely and unlikely countries around the world. None of the patents
is earth-shaking, but in various degrees each has value and, together with
the client's all-important technology, can open the way to third parties to
* Member of the Ohio Bar.
'E.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F.
Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
2 E.g., McLaren, Patent Licenses and Antitrust Considerations, 413 AN=rntU=T TRADE REG.
REP. X-11 (1969); Stern, Antitrust Irmplications of Lear v. Adkins, 15 ANTITRUST BULL. 663
(1970); Stern, The Antitrust Status of Territorial Limitations in International Patent Licens-
ing, 498 Aimnmusr TRADE RE. REP. F-1 (1971); Donnem, The Antitrust Attack on Restric-
tive Patent License Provisions, 14 AmTnT=UST BULL 749 (1969).
3 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp.
271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971). What a foreign court may do, at
the suit of a foreign party, is another matter. The knowledge that a clause which is an anathema
to U. S. antitrust doctrine may be perfectly enforceable elsewhere helps keep the draftsman on
the qui rive.
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engage successfully in the client's business, to manufacture like products
in the same superior way and to use the same processes to achieve a like
commercially desirable result.
All of this has been achieved by years of effort and at considerable
cost. It is an asset vital to the client's business but rarely represented at
anything like its actual value on the client's balance sheet. It is responsi-
ble in no small measure for the client's record of earnings growth, and
his position in the industry. The client knows it has value and in all like-
lihood he has had inquiries from others seeking to obtain licenses and has
turned them down. He has been sufficiently concerned to guard it against
unauthorized disclosure and to require his employees to sign confidential-
ity agreements and shrewd enough to bar his competitors from access to it.
Now he gets an inquiry from England, Germany or Japan. Limited
resources of money and manpower, and a sufficiently challenging domestic
market, have heretofore kept him from manufacturing overseas. He is
aware, of course, that there are large markets to be served there; he is
keenly interested in exploiting them. There is, therefore, an apparent
opportunity to realize an immediate and continuing cash return on his
accumulated know-how and patents and also to establish a foothold, a
bridgehead, in a foreign market through a licensee.
The client may never have heard of the foreign firm before, but if the
negotiations are successful and a license agreement is signed, more likely
than not a cordial business relationship will arise. Purely technical re-
quirements of trademark law will oblige the licensor to interest himself
in the quality of products manufactured and sold by the licensee under the
licensor's trademarks.4 But over and above such considerations will be
the commercial and cooperative ties that bind the parties, ranging from
interchanges of technical personnel to royal visits of corporate executives
and proud mention of the affiliation in annual reports to stockholders.
A license, in that typical situation, is more than a technical device by
which permission to do something is given to one person by another who
has the power to prohibit it. It is the core of a complex relationship, com-
mercial in motivation, educational in concept, familial (and essentially
non-competitive) in spirit. The licensor client expects to realize a specific
and reasonably calculable cash return on what he has undertaken to li-
cense plus some incalculable future benefits from the extension of his in-
fluence and knowledge into new foreign markets. Somewhere down the
road he envisions the possibility of a joint venture, an acquisition or an
amalgamation which will make his participation in foreign markets an
investment rather than just a contractual engagement. He does not ex-
pect his existing business to be taken away from him or to be directly chal-
lenged by a new competitor whom he has himself educated and trained in
4 See, e.g., Ladas, Problems of Licensing Abroad, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 411, 437.
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his best and most up-to-date manufacturing techniques, in an already
crowded home market. Indeed, he has already rejected requests for li-
censes by domestic competitors because he did not want to trade a short-
term cash return for a long-term deterioration in his competitive position.
So the licensor wants to arrive at an understanding with his prospective
licensee, as explicit and enforceable as possible, limiting the licensee to his
home territory, possibly reserving certain fields of use or customers to him-
self or other licensees and requiring the licensee to keep him abreast of any
new developments he may make and to maintain the confidentiality of all
information transmitted to him. In return the licensor is prepared to
consider limitations on his own commercial activities outside the United
States and to spread his compensation (or royalties) indefinitely into the
rosy future.
What must one, as counselor, tell the client about the reasonableness
of his expectations? The question has been posed broadly to obviate some
easy threshold escapes from hard questions. Of course, if there is no di-
rect and substantial effect reasonably foreseeable on United States com-
merce with foreign nations, there is not likely to be any Sherman Act
problem. Analysis may likewise disclose no problems under the regula-
tions of the Common Market, or the Japanese Fair Trade Commission, or
such other national or regional antitrust norms as may be applicable. But
assume no such ready assurances can be given, and the client's proposed
course of action seems to offer sufficient promise of substantial success and
impact to send one to a library for guidance. What should one look for
and what is one likely to find?
In the first place, one needs to be quite clear as to the differences be-
tween a patent and know-how. A patent is a statutory right to exclude
others from making, using and selling within the granting jurisdiction.
This right to exclude is given certain attributes of property by the patent
statutes: it may be assigned; a license may be granted under it as to all or
part of the United States; a royalty may be charged for the license.5 The
invention or discovery claimed by the patent is disclosed therein for all to
read. It has a life of 17 years. Its purpose is to encourage inventors to
disclose their inventions and to contribute them to the public by giving
the inventors the exclusive right to exploit the inventions during the statu-
tory period. After the statutory period expires, anyone may use the in-
vention free from any claims by the inventor.6 The statute requires an
invention to be of a high order to warrant patent protection,7 and the pat-
ent, when it issues, is supposed to describe the invention clearly and with
5 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1964).
635 U.S.C. § 154 (1964); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., Inc., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
7 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1964); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1
(1966).
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precision, particularly specifying the protected novelty.8 Any attempt to
extend the patent monopoly beyond its statutory limits-even by collect-
ing royalties after its expiration9 or by requiring the licensee to accept a
package of patentsl°-is a misuse of the patent, and may constitute a vio-
lation of the Sherman Act.
Know-how, on the other hand, is a loose and variable term, not de-
fined by statute, which comprehends the widest variety of commercially
valuable information, tangible and intangible. Know-how is unpatented,
in most cases is not patentable, and generally does not rise to the demi-
mondaine dignity of a trade secret. It is valuable because it is not gen-
erally known and because knowledge of it can confer a commercial advan-
tage. It is of uncertain dimensions and duration and is difficult to describe.
Usually it is a by-product of the owner's struggle to succeed and therefore
it represents substantial sweat and expense that would have to be dupli-
cated by any new entrant into the owner's field. For that reason it com-
mands a good price in the market; unlike the untried patent, know-how
generally carries with it ample tangible testimonials as to its utility in
achieving commercial success.
The common law recognizes the value inherent in confidential know-
how and protects it from unauthorized disclosure through breach of fidu-
ciary relationship or contractual obligation. But there is no assurance of
monopoly; anyone who discovers the know-how without fraud or imposi-
tion is free to use it."
It has been common, in the literature and cases as well as in the think-
ing of lawyers and businessmen, to amalgamate patents and know-how
and to treat them, for licensing purposes, as substantially the same. True,
it has generally been conceded that know-how is a lesser order of property
than a patent and that restrictions imposed by know-how license can in no
case exceed, and in some cases cannot duplicate, those permissible in a
patent license of similar import.12  But on balance it has been traditional
to treat patents and know-how in licensing transactions as goose and gan-
der.
Since, by common consent, it is highly unlikely that restrictive know-
how licensing can rise higher than restrictive patent licensing, and since
8 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964).
0 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
10 United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard
Concrete Wall, Inc., 367 F.2d 678, 679-81 (6th Cir. 1966); American Securit Co. v. Shatter-
proof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
11 See generally MacDonald, Know-How Licensing and the Antitrust Laws, 62 MICH. L
REV. 351 (1964).
12 "All in all, it is not realistic to expect the courts to be more generous toward know-how
than they are toward patents. If anything, they are likely to be more niggardly." Stedman,
Acquisition of Patents and Know-How by Grant, Fraud, Purchase and Grant-Back, 12 ANTI-
TRUST BuLL. 199, 222 (1967); to the same effect, see Timberg, The Impact of Antitrust Laws
on Multinational Licensing and Franchising Arrangements, 13 ANTIrRUST BULL. 39,49 (1968).
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in any case there are remarkably few cases involving restricted licenses
of know-how unmixed with patents or trademarks or both, and those
rather old,"3 it will be useful to review briefly our standing in the patent-
antitrust league. Those who follow the averages will have little difficulty
anticipating the answer.
As everyone knows, the assumption that a pastiche of patents, trade-
marks and know-how could somehow explain and justify, as "ancillary"
to the rights licensed, an elaborate international arrangement designed to
eliminate or regulate competition among industrial giants came crashing
to the floor in the late 1940's and early 1950's. 14 The cartel cases were
enough to chill most notions of elaborate, permanent, anti-competitive
international arrangements based upon, or including, these typical practices:
(1) Price-fixing of patented and unpatented products.
(2) Licenses requiring assignments or cross-licenses of future
patent rights, on an exclusive basis.
(3) Exclusive exchanges of know-how.
(4) Territorial allocations of patent, trademark, and know-how
rights.
(5) Acknowledgements of the validity of existing and future
patents and inventions.
(6) Restrictions on export, or manufacture for export.
More recently, we have been reminded that a cooperative effort by inter-
national competitors to manipulate patent rights in order to achieve a
territorial division of markets based on those rights, and to exclude foreign
competition from the United States market, is a violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act.' 5 The same conclusion followed from a cooperative
international attempt, through the pooled or cross-licensed use of patents,
to exclude an American manufacturer from foreign markets.' 6 Further-
more, the Government has taken the same view of a long-term, extensive
cooperative international arrangement based on an exchange of technolo-
gies and having the purpose and effect of allocating national markets, in
its pending action against Westinghouse and Mitsubishi.' 7
13 The principal know-how cases, sustaining reasonable territorial limitations in licenses be-
tween American and foreign companies, are United States v. B. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), af'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 377 (1956) and Foundry
Services, Inc. v. Beneflux Corp., 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), rev'd on other grounds,
206 F.2d 214 (2d Cit. 1953). See Wolfe, Restrictions in Know-How Agreements, 12 ANTI-
/'UST BULL. 749 (1967).
14 United States v. Holophane Co., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd, 352
U.S. 903 (1956); United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.
1951); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949); affd,
341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949);
United States v. General Electric Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United States v. Na-
tional Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), affd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
15 United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
16 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
"'tUnited States v, Washington Elec. Corp., Civil No. C-70-852 (N.D. Cal., filed April
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Quite aside from those international trustbusting cases in the grand
manner there has been a series of attacks on the patent citadel which has
risen to such a crescendo as to be called by Marcus Holiabaugh "The
Second Patent Crusade."' 8  The theme is that of Richard W. McLaren,
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice, who announced in a June, 1969, speech:
In considering whether to attack a particular licensing provision or prac-
tice, we ask ourselves two fundamental questions. First, is the particular
provision justifiable as necessary to the patentee's exploitation of his lawful
monopoly? Second, are less restrictive alternatives which are more likely
to foster competition available to the patentee? Where the answer to the
first question is no, and to the second yes, we will consider bringing a case
challenging the restriction involved.'9
So rapid has the pace of change been that, as Tommy Austern has
noted, "reporting the current legal rules on patent licensing is an ephemeral
and hazardous undertaking."'  Licensee estoppel, the ancient doctrine that
a patent licensee is estopped to challenge the validity of the patent under
which he is licensed, was invalidated by the Supreme Court in Lear, Inc.
v. Adkins.21
Numerous other patent law doctrines, of varying antiquity and pre-
sumed legality, are presently in doubt quite apart from their presence in
typical cartel cases, for example:
(1) Field of use limitations;
(2) Restrictions on form, manner or channels of distribution of
sale of patent products;
(3) Territorial and output limitations;
(4) Single-licensee price fixing;
(5) Royalty discrimination;
22, 1970). Developments in this case are being followed closely by the EEC Commission,
which has announced its intention to intervene against any licensing agreements containing
restrictive clauses between the companies involved and Common Market firms, 2 CCH Comm.
MKr. REP. 5 9402 (1970).
lsHollabaugh, The Scott Amendments v. The Secopd Patent Crusade, 39 A.B.A. ANTI-
TRUST LJ. 780 (1970). The tale is succintly told in an article by White and Staubitz, The
Antitrust Attack on Patent Licensing-From Light Bulbs to Lear Jets, 25 Bus. LAWYER 1725
(1970).19 Mc.aren, Patent Licenses and Antitrust Considerations, 413 .ANTITRUST TRADE REG.
REP. X-11, X-12 (1969). As noted in the article by White and Staubitz, supra note 18, this
has been repeated, substantially verbatim, by Roland W. Donnem, formerly Director of Policy
Planning for the Antitrust Division; Bruce B. Wilson, Special Assistant to Mr. McLaren; and
Richard H. Stern, Chief of the newly organized Patent United in the Antitrust Division.
20 Austern, Fish Traps, Indians and Patents, 12 ANTrRusT BULL 225, 229 (1967).
21395 U.S. 653 (1969). The rule applies equally to exclusive and non-exclusive licenses.
Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Developments Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 58 (7th Cir. 1970).
Acknowledgment of patent validity and agreements not to contest the same during the term of
the license agreement "or thereafter" were held (the patent having proven to be invalid) to have
resulted in monopolization by the licensor in violation of the Sherman Act in Bendix Corp. v.
Balox, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Wis. 1971), on remand from 421 F.2d 809 (7th Cir.
1970).
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(6) Package licensing;
(7) Grant-backs (other than on a nonexclusive, royalty-paid ba-
sis); and
(8) Contractual provisions which tend to inhibit the granting of
future licenses to third parties.22
The Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, in a paper presented in
Cleveland before the Ohio State Bar Association's Antitrust Law Seminar
on April 30, 1971, based his opposition to the so-called Scott Amend-
ments"3 in part on the grounds that they would have the effect of vindi-
cating certain of those practices, including field of use licensing. This
determined onslaught makes it exceedingly dangerous to rely on last year's
analysis, much less that of a few years back.2 4
How far we have come may be seen in two recent speeches relating
to the validity of territorial limitations in foreign patent and know-how li-
censes, one by the general counsel of a major American chemical com-
pany, the other by Robert Stern, the Chief of the Antitrust Division's
Patent Unit. It has been instinctive among patent antitrust lawyers for
many years to distinguish between limitations imposed in the grant itself,
and restrictions imposed by agreement, the former being considered unex-
ceptionable, and the latter suspect under § 1 of the Sherman Act 2 At
this juncture it is pertinent to observe the directions which this doctrine is
taking.
In an address before the Association of the Bar of the City of New
22Donnem, The Antitrust Attack on Restrictive Patent License Provisions, 14 ANTITRUST
BULL. 749 (1969).
2 Amendments Nos. 23 and 24 to S. 643, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Amendment No.
24 would, among other things, permit field of use and limited territorial patent licensing, pro-
hibit assignors from challenging validity of assigned patents without returning the purchase
price; and require licensees to surrender all future benefits under the license before challenging
the validity of the licensed patent. It would also import the rule of reason into restrictive
patent licensing (contrary to Mr. McLaren's test of necessity, supra note 19) by permitting the
inclusion in patent licenses of restrictions "reasonable under the circumstances to secure the
patent owner the full benefit of his invention and patent grant" The other amendment would
prevent the Patent Act from being construed to preempt state or federal laws of contracts, trade
secrets or unfair competition. See also remarks of Senator Scott and memoranda in support of
the amendments, 506 ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP. E-I et seq. (1971); summary of comments
on proposed amendments at the regional meeting of the Licensing Executives Society held in
Washington on April 27, 1971, as reported in 510 ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP. A-7 (1971).
Contra, summary of testimony by Richard W. McLaren before the Senate Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 11, 1971, 5
CCH TRADE REG. REP. 5 50,301 (1971).
24 E.g., Barton, Limitations on Territory, Field of Use, Quantity and Price in Know-How
Agreements with Foreign Companies, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 243 (1967); MacDonald, Know-
How Licensing and the Antitrust Laws, 62 MICH. L. REV. 351 (1964); Wolfe, Restrictions in
Know-How Agreements, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 749 (1967); cf. Stedman, Legal Problems in the
International and Domestic Licensing of Know-How, 29 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 247 (1965).
2 5 The syllogism is simple: a restricted grant of license is essentially a unilateral limited
exercise of power conferred on the patentee by the patent laws, and therefore (by definition) not
a restrictive agreement subject to the application of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1970).
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York on May 1, 1969,26 the corporate general counsel suggested that it is
dangerous to grant a patent or know-how license to make, use and sell
"in country X," albeit with no prohibitions whatever, because this might
be subject to the interpretation (and might be understood by the parties
to mean) that the licensee was restricted from using or selling the prod-
ucts elsewhere. He urged the inclusion of a clause explicitly stating that
no limitation was intended on use or sale of the licensed product, or the
product of the licensed process or know-how, at least within the United
States. To prevent the interpretation that such a provision gives a license
under any United States patent covering the product or process, the corpo-
rate general counsel suggested the addition of a clause to the effect that
such provision is not intended to confer any rights under any United States
patents.
Mr. Stern, in a speech before the Annual Meeting of the Antitrust Law
Section of the New York State Bar Association on January 27, 1971,7 as-
serted that there is no difference between a prohibition imposed on a li-
censee not to export to the United States and a failure to grant a license
under a United States patent, and that the only question to be determined
is whether the resulting restraint is undue.28  This, he suggested, requires
a "factor analysis" approach involving the size of the licensor and licensee,
the amount of commerce involved, the package of patents licensed, the
term of the agreement, whether there is cross-licensing, and the imposition
of restrictions other than territorial. In the latter connection Mr. Stern
asserted:
ITlhe presence of such provisions as customer-class restrictions, field
restrictions, quantity limits, and the like, will necessarily convert what the
defendant alleges is a pure case of merely reserving domestic patent rights
into something quite different.2 9
Mr. Stern generously concluded that, in the case of a single and nondomi-
nating patent, he is prepared to permit a U.S. patentee to refrain from li-
censing a foreign licensee under the parallel U.S. patent, without crying
2 6 Afore, U.S. Antitrust Laws and Territorial Provisions in Licensing Foreign Patents and
Know-How for Foreign Use, 24 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 512 (1969).
27 498 ArITRUST TRADE REG. REP. F-1 (1971).
28 Mr. Stem's analysis has perhaps been foreshadowed by the Common Market's concern over
restraints of the intra-community trade resulting from parallel national trade-marks and patents.
See the opinions of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Constern and Grundig
v. E.E.C. Commission, CCH CoMM. MA=. REP. 5 8046 (1966) and Sirena v. Eda, CCH CowM.
MfKT. REP. 5 8101 (1971); both relating to the impropriety of using national trade-mark rights,
acquired or licensed by agreement (and therefore within the reach of Article 85 of the Common
,farket Treaty), to impair EEC trade or distort EEC competition by preventing the free flow of
goods across national boundaries, and Parke, Davis & Co. v. Centaform, CCH COMM. MKT.
REP. 5 8054 (1968); to the effect, in part, that concerted use of parallel national patents to pre-
vent intro.EEC competition would violate Article 85. See also Alexander, The Establishment
of the Commop Afarket and the Problem of Parallel Patents, 14 ANTiTRUSr BULL 181 (1969).
20498 ANnTRusT TRADE REG. REP. F-3 (1971).
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foul. It is not possible to quarrel with his observation that "careful draft-
ing makes a difference to the probable antitrust risks." 30
In short, it appears that any attempt to rationalize competition by re-
strictive patent licensing, whether nationally or internationally, is a very
uncertain undertaking (although a reservation must be entered as to the
effect of the Scott Amendments to the Patent Act, if perchance they should
be enacted in substantially their present form). There is no reason to sup-
pose that restrictive know-how licensing will be treated any better.
Before one proceeds to advise a client, however, there remains the duty
of examining the effects of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, upon the whole notion
of licensing know-how. In that case Lear sought to avoid paying royalties
to Mr. Adkins under an agreement on the grounds that the licensed patent
was invalid. Mr. Adkins replied, among other things, that Lear was es-
topped to challenge the validity of the patent and was obliged, in any
case, to pay royalties irrespective of the validity of the patent. The only
question presented for review was whether Lear was barred by the doctrine
of licensee estoppel from challenging the validity of the patent and the en-
forceability of its obligation to pay royalties. Having concluded that the
doctrine was inconsistent with federal patent policy, the Court overruled
the line of cases which embodied licensee estoppel and reversed Mr. Ad-
kins' judgment. However, in so doing, the Court also considered whether
federal patent policy bars a State from enforcing a contract regulating ac-
cess to an unpatented secret idea. The Court concluded that "the strong
federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas in the public domain"
precluded any recovery by Adkins of royalties accruing after patent issu-
ance if the patent should prove to be invalid. As to pre-patent issuance
royalties, recognizing the problems of state as well as federal law involved,
the Court remanded without attempting to define in even a limited way
the extent, if any, to which the states may properly act to enforce the con-
tractual rights of inventors of unpatented secret ideas.
In his celebrated separate opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Jus-
tice Douglas, Justice Black conceded to any inventor the right to keep his
discovery secret but asserted that any attempt to disclose it for contractual
payments would frustrate the national policy expressed in the patent laws.31
In other words, it was Justice Black's view that the disclosure of industrial
or commercial know-how can only be an eleemosynary educational ven-
ture which could not, as a matter of federal patent policy, support the
payment of a valuable consideration, much less, it seems clear, restrictions
on its use.
Mr. Justice White also filed a separate opinion, in which he suggested,
30498 ANTrom1T TRADE REG. REP. F-4 (1971).
31 At least one writer considered, but discarded, a requirement that every innovation be dis-
closed, Doerfer, The Limits on; Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Antitrust
Supremacy, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1432 (1967).
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among other things, that state law may still protect the inventor's claim
for the value of whatever headstart his disclosures may have given the li-
censee, whether that value accrued before or after issuance of the patent.
This view was, however, rejected by the majority opinion, which restricted
the inventor's potential recovery solely to the period preceding patent is-
suance.
Mr. Stern, who was on the government's amicus brief in the case,32 has
since suggested:
The logical implication of Lear v. Adkins may well be that public pol-
icy forbids the enforcement of many private contractual arrangements that
provide for patent-owner-like controls over unpatented matter such as tech-
nical information, trade secrets, or the subject matter of patent applica-
tions.53
He further suggested, based on that case, that restrictions invalid if based
on patents are surely invalid if based on know-how or trade secrets. Re-
strictions of questionable status in the patent field--quantity limits, single
licensee price-fixing, use restrictions, competitively injurious royalty dis-
crimination and territorial limitations of the kind permitted by the patent
statutes, are considered by Mr. Stern to be plainly invalid where applied
to know-how. He points out that royalties are themselves a form of re-
straint, but concedes that the right to contract for and receive royalties in
return for know-how has been left open by Lear. He suggests the test
should be whether the know-how is valuable, and not already in the public
domain.
One may wonder where the state law doctrines now stand upholding
a right of action based upon the improper acquisition from the plaintiff
of information in the public domain.34 Judge Constance Baker Motley,
in the Southern District of New York, appears to have taken Justice Black's
opinion as setting that question to rest. In Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc.,35
Bourns, a U.S. manufacturer, licensed Painton, an English company, with
respect to Bourns' potentiometer know-how. A 1962 license agreement
expired in 1968. The agreement contained no provisions relating to re-
turn or non-use of the know-how after termination. Bourns demanded
that Painton cease to use the know-how and either return it, or pay for it.
Painton brought a declaratory judgment action to establish its right to re-
tain the know-how free from further payments. On cross motions for
32 Close reading of the Government's amicus brief (e.g., at 19, 20, 23-26) shows that the
Government carefully distinguished the naked right of monopoly represented by a patent, which
a licensee should be free to attack, from valuable trade secrets, which were assumed to be prop-
erly subject to protection under state law.
33 Stern, Antitrust Implications of Lear v. Adkins, 15 ANTImrST BULL. 663 (1970).
34 See, e.g., Kirsel v. Duran, 258 F. Supp. 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, F.2d 179 (2d Cir-
1967) and Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS,.
§§ 757, 759 (1939).
35 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
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summary judgment, Judge Motley held Painton free of any further obli-
gation to Bourns with respect to unpatented materials. On the facts pre-
sented, the court could have rested on the fact that the expired contract
contained no provision for return of the know-how. The court noted the
availability of that ground for its decision under applicable California law.
But the court also proclaimed, as its first alternative ground, the overriding
policy of the patent laws (a) not to reward ideas which do not rise to a
sufficiently high level of invention and (b) giving the public the benefit of
full disclosure of all nonpatented ideasO6
As pointed out by Jack Lahr in a perceptive analysis,37 these cases and
comments fail to make an adequate analysis of the grounds validating the
licensing of know-how and trade secrets for a consideration. It is incon-
ceivable that all rights to sell know-how in consideration of compensation,
whether in a lump sum or by way of royalties, will be destroyed by judi-
cial fiat."8 Nor will the scheme recently put forward by Kingman Brews-
ter, once the grand panjandrum of United States international antitrust and
now the President of Yale University, to collect tuition from undergrad-
uates by levying a royalty on their future incomes for thirty-five years after
graduation, likely be held invalid in the wake of Lear.39
Getting back to the original question, what can one tell a would-be
licensor client about the reasonableness of his restrictive licensing expecta-
36 In an earlier opinion, Epstein v. Dennison Manufacturing Co., 314 F. Supp. 116, 125
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), written immediately subsequent to Lear, Judge Motley noted the divergent
views of the majority and minority in that case and observed that the law in the Second Circuit
"[long prior to Lear, was that possessors of trade secrets or secret ideas could have limited
recovery for the wrongful use of their ideas prior to the issuance of their patents. They could
recover such damages as could be proved resulted from the wrongdoer getting to the market
sooner (or gaining some advantage over his competitors) than would have been possible had
the wrongdoer waited for the issuance of the patent." The opinion of the Court of Appeals,
reversing Painton, makes it clear that that this remains the law in the Second Circuit. See also
Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 415, 421 (D. Del. 1970).
37 Lahr, The Federal Preemption Doctrine: Protection of Industrial Property and Its Rela-
tion to, the Sherman Act, 39 A.B.A. AnTRus'r L.J. 812 (1970).
38 As noted in 84 HARv. L REV. 477 (1970), at 482, and by the Second Circuit in revers-
ing Painton, the District Court's opinion in that case would have the effect of causing manu-
facturers to keep know-how to themselves, with resulting economic inefficiency and encourage-
ment to monopoly, 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971). The Second Circuit also cited an amicus
brief for the estimate that the rule adopted by the District Court in Painton might cost American
licensors $1 billion annually in lost know-how royalties from foreign licenses.
In any event, it seems that the wholesale invalidation of know-how licensing portended by
Judge Motley's decision, hopefully in misplaced reliance on dicta and dissent in Lear, has been
averted, and perhaps even that territorial restrictions and other restrictive clauses such as those
contained in the Bourns-Painton agreement (including prohibitions against design changes by
the licensee, payment of royalties after termination of the license agreement, required use of the
licensor's trademark, prohibition of sale by the licensee of competitive products, and obligation
to preserve the confidentiality of the know-how disclosed), which were described without com-
ment in the Second Circuit's opinion, may still have some vitality.
39 N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1971 at 1, col. 3 (city ed.); id. Feb. 6, 1971 at 26, col. 1. It has been
suggested that the earlier, more limited view that a licensor may not license and collect royalty
on technical information in the public domain might bar the collection of legal fees, Wolfe,
Restrictions in Know-How Agreements, 12 ANTITRusT BULL. 749, 753 n.16 (1967).
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tions? In the light of those cases, the announced (and pronounced) view
of the Antitrust Division, the mournful prophecies of the academic Cas-
sandras, the cautious comments of the high-priced private antitrust bar,
and some personal experience with the negotiation and drafting of inter-
national patent/know-how/trademark agreements, it is suggested that one
must answer along the following lines:
First, that a client must accept the risk-and even the probability-
that the prospective licensee will sooner or later (depending on relevant
economic and market factors) become a vigorous competitor in the client's
home market, and that there is no effective way to stop this from happen-
ing. At the very least, the licensee, once well-established abroad, will
constitute an obstacle to the client's own overseas expansion, or the client's
choice of a new licensee if the first proves unsatisfactory.
Second, that know-how, once given, is, as a practical matter (if no
longer as a matter of law under the district court's decision in the Painton
case), irretrievable. There can be no going back, no return to the status
quo ante for any reason, including termination of the license agreement
and dissolution of the relationship between the parties. There is, indeed,
some question as to the licensor's ability to enforce a confidentiality re-
striction upon the licensee, or even to keep the licensee from freely resell-
ing or relicensing the know-how to third parties without the licensor's
knowledge, consent, or participation in the proceeds.
Third-and this is a purely practical observation-that the obligations
of a licensor in an international license relationship are generally more
onerous and costly, and less profitable, to the licensor than is indicated by
his most conservative calculations. In such cases the licensor suffers under
a psychological compulsion to make the licensed know-how work and work
well, regardless of cost and consequences, with adverse direct and indirect
effects upon the licensor's own operations.
Fourth, that the long-term quasi-permanent international or multi-
national relationship of independent firms developing in parallel and non-
competitive markets, cross-fertilizing each other with their respective new
developments and respecting each others' market structures, all based upon
the licensing concept, is increasingly a rarity, which can no longer be as-
sured or relied upon.
Fifth, that the licensor must accept the proposition that his patent
and technology package has a finite and limited value, realizable over the
short or medium term, and any longer-term benefits that may flow from
licensing it are likely to be serendipitous.
Sixth, that the licensor must be prepared to meet the demands of his
licensee for reasonable protection from competition, without transgressing
applicable law or stultifying his own ability to compete, directly or through
another licensee, in the licensee's home market.
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The prospect, therefore, is by no means altogether inviting. The client
is faced at the outset with Hobson's choice: either he must keep his hands
in his pockets or he must extend them to his prospective licensee substan-
tially without restriction or qualification. In the present state of the law,
it is perhaps still permissible for nondominant licensors to license non-
competitors, subject to short term territorial limitations.40 The recommen-
dation, a decade ago, of Kingman Brewster, still seems viable:
[Plresumptive legality designed to give more certain scope to know-
how licensing should be satisfied if the information transferred were of
demonstrable productive value, if the restrained recipient were not a pre-
existing actual or potential competitor in the American market, and if the
agreement's restraints had a terminal date short of ten years.41
It will happen in most cases, of course, that the licensee will not be in a
position to compete actively in the American market during the period
necessary for him to digest the know-how and put it to effective use in his
own operations, and it is only thereafter, when the permissible period of
restriction runs out, that the real competitive threat will arise.
Territorial restrictions imposed by economic realities may be every bit
as effective as restrictions imposed by limited grant or agreement. A li-
censee in an underdeveloped country is less likely, on the whole, to be a
near-term potential competitor in the United States market than a devel-
oped-country licensee. The higher the degree of technology involved, and
the greater the requirements of the underdeveloped country, the more cor-
rect this will be. The nature of the product to be manufactured by use
of the know-how may also affect the potentiality of the competitive threat.
High freight and duty barriers still operate as obstacles to effective compe-
tition. And the requirement that the licensee pay royalties to the licensor
necessarily adds to this competitive burden and enhances the competitive
position of the licensor.
There are several techniques which may be permissible for mitigating
the harsh consequences of "putting a gun" in the hands of the licensee-
competitor and inviting him to shoot the licensor with it, to use Professor
Stedman's image.42 In an industry characterized by the rapid obsoles-
cence of technology, the transmittal of information can be limited to that
current on the making of the license. By the time this information ex-
pires, the licensor should be in a superior competitive position. Of course,
such a solution may bar a requirement that the licensee disclose and license
40 The EEC Commission recently announced that it proposed to approve a patent and
trademark license between a French licensor and a Japanese licensee whereby the latter would
be restricted to manufacturing and selling in Japan. The Commission did not disclose the
duration of the agreement, 13 E.E.C.J.O., No. C144 (Dec. 5, 1970) at 8; 2 CCH COMM. MKT.
REP. 5 9400 (1970).
4 1 See BREWSTER, Aismusr AND AMmucAN BUSINEss ABROAD 450 (1958).
42 Legal Problems iv the International and Domestic Liceming of Know-How, 29 A.B.A.
ANnTusTr L.J. 247 (1965).
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improvements back to the licensor. 43  Alternatively, the license can pro-
vide for a full exchange of know-how during a limited term followed by
a period with no such exchange, a tapering off of royalties, decreasing by,
for example, 1 percent per year for a period of four years, and the right
to enter into new and additional license agreements in the territory. This
will help to cushion the inevitable competitive confrontation, and give
the licensor an opportunity, on its part, to engage in competition with the
licensee in the latter's home market, either directly or through other li-
censees.
A practical comment may be in order here: since in most cases the li-
censor's contribution of know-how is substantially completed in the early
months after the signing of a license, and it is primarily the licensee who
must perform thereafter during the remaining term of the license, a close
look should be given by licensor's counsel to the form of force majeure
clause too often uncritically included in license agreements. It is usually
not intended that the licensee's obligation to pay royalties, for example,
be readily suspended as a result of any of the perils customarily inserted
in such clauses; and the licensor will not long need the protections such
clauses afford. On the other hand, one should take pains to include lan-
guage broad enough to extricate a client if there are sound antitrust rea-
sons to do so, sparing him (and his counsel) the embarrassment of being
under United States compulsion not to do something which a foreign
jurisdiction insists upon.
Finally, it may be possible to shift the problem area from the restric-
tive-licensing field to the joint venture field, perhaps with some diminu-
tion in exposure to antitrust attack. If the licensor is an investor-partici-
pant in a joint venture company, to which runs an unrestricted license, he
may cast his vote as shareholder or director for or against proposed com-
mercial or industrial activities on the part of the licensee without flourish-
ing any contractual muscle. International joint ventures pose problems
of their own, to be sure, but they are less likely to raise the threshold anti-
trust problems increasingly common in the licensing area.44 In a joint
venture situation, it is not unusual for the foreign joint venturer to de-
mand an agreement from the licensor not to compete, or permit other li-
censees to compete, with the joint venture. Assuming a significant impact
on United States foreign commerce, agreement with such a demand is
plainly perilous. It may be possible to reduce (but not necessarily elimi-
nate) the antitrust hazard by offering, in lieu of such a commitment, a buy-
out option to the foreign joint venturer in the event of such competition.
43 Note the E.E.C. position that nonexclusive grantbacks on improvements and know-how
are valid only where the licensor undertakes a mutual obligation, Offlcial Notice on Patent Li-
censing Arrangements, 1 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 5 2698 (1971).
44 See the discussion in More, U. S. Antitrust Laws and Territorial Provisions in Licensing
Foreign Patents and Know-How for Foreign Use, 24 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 512, 518 (1969).
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While it may be claimed that the existence of the option operates to dis-
courage competition by the licensor, particularly where the terms of buy-
out are punitive, at least it avoids the stigma of explicit agreement.
Where a client embarks on a program of multi-national parallel know-
how licensing agreements, particular care is required. The Common Mar-
ket has recognized the hazards implicit in such programs by refusing to
exclude from prima fade applicability of Article 85 paragraph 1 of the
Treaty of Rome agreements relating to joint patents, reciprocal licenses and
multiple parallel licenses.45 There is undoubted social and economic util-
ity in the practice of exchanging information on technological develop-
ments among a licensor and its multinational licensees, so that all may
freely practice the latest and most efficient methods. On the other hand,
it is unlikely that the participants would be quite so willing to participate
-assuming that they are actual or potential competitors in each other's
home markets-without an understanding, express or implied, that they
will respect those exclusive territories, as well as cooperate to hinder the
entrance of newcomers into their field of business.
The demands of foreign licensees or licensors to be free from competi-
tive conflict are a separate problem, albeit governed by the same general
principles. It is one thing to preach restraint in the imposition of restraints
to one's American client; it is something else to persuade a non-American
and his non-American lawyer that one is not wearing a sanctimonious cloak
of righteousness in so doing in order to hide one's real ulterior competi-
tive purposes. Where the non-American seeks to license his know-how
in the United States, the prospect of American long-arm antitrust jurisdic-
tion over him, drawn from the recent spate of patent cases, may suffice to
make him a willing listener.4" If he nonetheless persists in demanding the
imposition of restrictions which alarm one's better judgment, and a client
would rather accept the risk than lose the bargain, there may, in some
cases at least, be a certain utility in requiring the foreign licensor to assert
in writing that the desired restrictions are being imposed as a condition of
the license or to record a client's objections to them. This procedure will
not help in cases of illegal market division, where a client shares in the
resulting benefits,47 but may be significant where a client is more the victim
than the participant.48 Where the foreign licensor requires a client to
45 Official Notice on Patent Licensing. Agreements, 1 CCH CoML MKT. REP. 2698
(1971).
46 Wallace, Multinational Patent and Know-How Arrangements, 39 A.B.A. ANTRusT LJ.
791 (1970).
4 7 See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), a/I'd,
332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 883 (D. N.J.
1949).
48Cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Ind., 395 U.S. 100, 139 (1969); Plastic
Contact Lens Co. v. Frontier of the Northeast, CCI TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cas.) 73,544
(2d Cir. 1971).
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agree not to export into the licensor's home market or elsewhere, on a per-
manent basis, one may find it useful, in negotiation, to offer to submit
the proposal to the Antitrust Division for an opinion as to its legality-
a ploy which must be weighed against the likelihood that the proposed
licensor will promptly conclude the negotiations.49
In sum advice to a client comes down to this:
(1) License sparingly, in special situations, and only for excellent
reasons-for example, where there is no other way to exploit a market;
where the licensor stands to gain from a general advance in the art;
in order to create a demand for other products marketed by the licensor;
where there is little practical likelihood that the licensee will become a
competitor; or for a very substantial return.
(2) Do not count on establishing a long-term mutually protec-
tive relationship in licensor-licensee form. Accept the license as a short-
term affair, and discount the romantic ever-after.
(3) Negotiate the highest price possible, to be paid at the outset
or over the short pull, in plain recognition of the hidden costs of li-
censing and a client's inability in law and fact to obtain lasting, ef-
fective protection from the licensee's competition.
If this makes a license negotiation into a tougher ball game than usual,
it offers the advantage, if successful, of putting ready cash into a client's
hands at the very outset, and that is likely to be gratifying both to him
and his attorney.
49 Cf. Rifkind, J., in United States v. National Lead Company, 63 F. Supp. 513, 531
(S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947): "Perhaps the answer is that DP, having discovered
the conspiracy, should have asked the Attorney General to break it up. Confessedly, the chances
of DP getting NL's patents and know-how after such a hostile act would be, to say the least,
dubious. But in any event the courts may not validate unlawful conduct because in a particular
instance there mar be social losses involved in enforcing the law."
1971]
